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Abstract
We study the competitive eﬀects of restricting direct access
to secondary care by gatekeeping, focusing on the informational
role of gatekeeping general practitioners (GPs). We consider a
secondary care market with two hospitals choosing the quality
and specialisation of their care. GPs perfectly observe the diag-
nosis of a patient and the exact characteristics of the secondary
care market. Patients are either informed or uninformed when ac-
cessing the hospital market. We consider two distinct cases: ﬁrst,
we let the fraction of informed patients be exogenous, implying
that the regulator can only inﬂuence patients’ decision of con-
sulting a GP by making this compulsory (‘direct gatekeeping’).
Second, we endogenise this fraction by assuming GP consultation
to be costly for the patient. Then the regulator can inﬂuence the
GP attendance rate through the regulated price (‘indirect gate-
keeping’). A main ﬁnding of the paper is that strict gatekeeping
may not be socially desirable, even if it is costless.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
T h eU Ka n dt h eS c a n d i n a v i a nc o u n t r i e sa r ee x a m p l e so fc o u n t r i e sw h e r e
general practitioners (GPs) have a gatekeeping role in the health care
system. Patients do not have direct access to secondary care. They need
a referral from their (primary care) GP to get access to a hospital or a
specialist.1 Restricting direct access to secondary care by giving GPs a
gatekeeper role is currently on the political agenda in Germany, while in
Sweden there has been some debate about whether patients should be
able to approach a specialist or a hospital directly.2 The current paper
contributes to the discussion on gatekeeping by analysing the competi-
tion eﬀects that arise when GPs are equipped with a gatekeeping role.
In general, there are two main arguments for introducing gatekeeping
in health care markets (see Scott, 2000). Firstly, it is usually claimed
that gatekeepers contribute to cost control by reducing ‘unnecessary’
interventions.3 Second, it is argued that secondary care is used more ef-
ﬁciently since ‘GPs usually have better information than patients about
the quality of care available from secondary care providers’ (Scott, 2000,
p. 1177). In the present paper we focus on the second argument,
highlighting the fact that making this information available to patients
changes the nature of competition between secondary care providers,
w h i c hi nt u r na ﬀects the social desirability of gatekeeping.
As pointed out in a seminal paper by Arrow (1963), uncertainty and
asymmetric information make health care markets diﬀerent from other
markets. Uncertainty generates demand for health insurance, imply-
ing that non-price strategies are important in attracting patients as the
consumption of medical care is paid for by a third party. Asymmetric in-
formation is present in the sense that consumers (patients) are typically
less informed about their health conditions, and thus the appropriate
treatment, than the providers of medical care. In this paper we stress
both these features of health care markets.
Building on the familiar model of Hotelling (1929), we consider a
secondary care market with two providers (hospitals). In order to at-
tract patients, and thus obtain third party payments, the hospitals have
1In the US, several Health Maintainance Organizations also practice gatekeeping.
Recently, however, some HMOs have relaxed the restrictions on access to specialists
(see, e.g., Ferris et al., 2001).
2The local authority in Stockholm has recently allowed patients to have direct
access to hospital care, while in the rest of Sweden patients still need a referral
before receiving secondary care.
3Although this is a common argument for restricting access to secondary care,
the empirical evidence that gatekeeping actually contributes to lower health care
expenditures seems to be scarce (see, e.g., Barros, 1998).
2two strategic variables at their disposal - location and quality of care.
We refer to location as the specialisation or service mix at a hospital,
though it may also be interpreted in geographical terms. Thus, hospitals
engage in non-price competition in terms of both horizontal and vertical
diﬀerentiation of services.
The major aim of the paper is to highlight the informational role
of gatekeepers in such secondary care markets. Without gatekeepers,
we assume that at least some of the patients are uninformed about both
their own speciﬁc diagonsis and the exact characteristics of the secondary
care market. Thus, with direct access to secondary care, patients’ choices
may be subject to substantial errors. First, a patient may end up in a
poor match, i.e., he may choose the hospital that is less able to cure his
disease. Second, he may decide to go to the specialist who provides the
lower quality of care. By introducing GP gatekeeping we assume that
all relevant information is transmitted to the patients, thereby enabling
them to make informed choices.4 Thus, GPs observe the actual disease
of a patient with certainty and know which specialist is more able to cure
a particular disease. Additionally, we assume that GPs obtain perfect
quality signals. Both features are in line with the above mentioned
second argument for introducing gatekeeping.
We analyse the informational role of gatekeepers by applying two
diﬀerent variants of the basic model. In the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e rw e
consider an exogenously given number (fraction) of patients that are
ap r i o r ifully informed about their disease and the most appropriate
treatment for this condition. One possible interpretation is to think of
these patients as the chronically ill who have obtained all relevant in-
formation through repeated consumption. Introducing GP gatekeeping
is then simply equivalent to making the uninformed fraction of patients
fully informed. Since gatekeeping can only be regulated directly, we refer
to this variant as ‘direct gatekeeping’. Although we consider gatekeeping
to be costless, we ﬁnd that introducing strict gatekeeping, i.e., making
it compulsory to get a referral to secondary care, is not necessarily so-
cially desirable. The reason is that more informed patients lead to more
intense quality competition between hospitals, amplifying the hospitals’
incentives to diﬀerentiate their services. Consequently, gatekeeping may
induce too much quality and diﬀerentiation from the viewpoint of social
welfare.5 However, we show that, under second-best price regulation,
4We abstract from agency problems by assuming that the GPs truthfully convey
their information to the patients.
5This result is related to Dranove et al. (2003), who empirically analyse whether
public disclosure of patient health outcomes at the level of the individual physician
or hospital (‘report cards’) is beneﬁcial to patients and social welfare. They ﬁnd that
3gatekeeping is always socially beneﬁcial. Thus, gatekeeping should be
accompanied by proper price regulation.
One might ask, however, if an uninformed patient would not vol-
untarily consult a GP before seeking secondary care. We argue that
consulting a GP may in itself involve costs for the patients, such as out-
of-pocket payments, travelling and/or time costs. A patient would then
have to compare the beneﬁts of consulting a GP - in terms of reduced
risk of choosing the less suitable hospital - against such costs. This sit-
uation is analysed in the second part of the paper, where we let the
fraction of informed patients be endogenously determined by this trade-
oﬀ. A crucial feature of this variant of the model is that GP consultation
can be indirectly inﬂuenced through price regulation. Consequently, we
will refer to this mechanism as ‘indirect gatekeeping’. The endogene-
ity of the consultation decision alters hospitals’ incentives. Although
diﬀerentiation relaxes quality competition, it also increases the fraction
of informed patients, since the (expected) beneﬁts of consulting a GP
now are higher. Thus, the incentives for diﬀerentiation of services are
weakened. Moreover, there is now a real cost of introducing a strict
gatekeeping regime, which is reﬂected in the individual costs of GP con-
sultation. In this case, individual consultation incentives coincide with
the social incentives, implying that there is no need to regulate gatekeep-
ing directly. However, we show that second-best price regulation implies
a de facto strict gatekeeping regime - in which every patient ﬁnds it ben-
eﬁcial to consult a GP before accessing the secondary care market - if
quality costs or GP consulting costs are suﬃciently low, or if mismatch
costs are suﬃciently high.
The paper relates to both the general literature on spatial competi-
tion and the literature on (imperfect) competition in health care markets.
The interaction between quality and location choices has been investi-
gated by Economides (1989) under price competition and Brekke et al.
(2002) under price regulation. The present paper contributes to this
literature by introducing imperfect information into the framework. As
previously mentioned, we ﬁnd that the hospitals’ incentives to diﬀer-
entiate services are signiﬁcantly altered by the presence of uninformed
consumers. In particular, we ﬁnd that uninformed consumers tend to
soften the incentives for horizontal diﬀerentiation. In this respect our
ﬁndings are in the spirit of Bester (1998), who shows that quality com-
petition may induce minimum diﬀerentiation - i.e., agglomeration at the
market centre - when consumers are uncertain about product quality
report cards led to both selection behaviour by providers and improved matching of
patients with hospitals. However, on net this led to higher levels of resource use and
to worse health outcomes (for sicker patients).
4and use observed prices to ascertain the quality of goods.
In a related paper, Calem and Rizzo (1995) analyse hospitals’ choices
of quality and speciality mix (location) under exogenous prices. An in-
centive for closer locations is introduced by assuming that the hospitals
cover a fraction of their patients’ mismatch costs. Besides this partic-
ular assumption, their paper diﬀers from ours in two important ways.
Firstly, they are not concerned with imperfect information and the issue
of gatekeeping and how this aﬀects the nature of competition in the mar-
ket for secondary care. Second, they do not consider the implications
of optimal price regulation on the hospitals’ incentives with respect to
quality and location choice.6
The paper also relates to the more general literature on transparency
in imperfectly competitive markets.7 Increased transparency on the con-
sumer side of the market typically leads to intensiﬁed price competition
and thus to a more socially desirable market outcome. Our paper con-
tributes to this literature by analysing the eﬀects of improved trans-
parency in markets that are characterised by non-price competition.I n
this case, more intense competition between ﬁrms does not necessarily
improve social welfare. Improved market transparency consequently has
ambiguous welfare eﬀects.8
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The basic frame-
work is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we consider the case of
‘direct gatekeeping’, where the fraction of informed patients is exoge-
nously given. In Section 4, we analyse the case of ‘indirect gatekeeping’,
where the fraction of informed patients are endogenously determined by
individual GP consultation decisions. In both sections we derive the
quality and specialisation equilibria and analyse the social desirability
of gatekeeping. We also discuss the issue of optimal price regulation.
Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
6Two other related papers applied to the primary care market are Gravelle (1999)
and Nuscheler (2003). Both papers address the issue of competition between physi-
cians by investigating the interaction between quality and location choices when
prices are regulated. Building on the seminal contribution of Salop (1979), they
apply a circular model with attention directed towards entry of physicians into the
market, so the focus of these papers is clearly quite diﬀerent from ours.
7See, e.g., Varian (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983), Schultz (2002, 2003), Lom-
merud and Sørgard (2003).
8Another related paper in this strand of the literature is Baye and Morgan (2001),
who analyse the competition eﬀects of information gatekeepers on the Internet, where
such gatekeepers create a market for price information by charging fees to ﬁrms that
advertise prices and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices.
52 The model
There is a continuum of patients with mass 1 distributed uniformly along
the Hotelling line S =[ 0 ,1]. The location of a patient is denoted z ∈ S
and is associated with the disease he suﬀers from. A disease z can be seen
as a realisation of a random variable Z which is uniformly distributed
on S. All patients need one medical treatment to be cured. There are
two health care providers - henceforth called hospitals - both able to
cure all diseases. However, they are diﬀerentiated with respect to the
disease they are best able to cure. Specialisation of a hospital is denoted
xi ∈ R, i =1 ,2. Without loss of generality, we will assume throughout
the paper that x1 ≤ x2. Note that the degree of specialisation is not
restricted to the disease space S. Thus hospitals may locate outside S.9
In addition to specialisation, there is a second strategic variable used
by the hospitals to attract patients, namely the quality of care qi ≥ 0,
i =1 ,2. Quality costs are assumed to be symmetric and quadratic, kq2
i,
where k>0. These costs are considered to be ﬁxed, i.e., they are in-
dependent of how many patients are actually treated. This implies that
quality has the characteristics of a public good at each hospital. Exam-
ples of such quality investments are the cost of searching for and hiring
more qualiﬁed medical staﬀ, additional training of existing medical staﬀ,
and investments in improved hospital facilities, which can be related to
both medical machinery and non-medical facilities such as room stan-
dard or catering quality. Without loss of generality, other ﬁxed costs
are set to zero. Marginal production costs are assumed to be constant
and equal to zero. This cost structure stresses the importance of ﬁxed
costs which seems reasonable for the hospital market.10 The price for
one treatment is denoted p ≥ 0 and is set by some regulatory author-
ity.11 As the price is independent of which hospital is actually attended
it may alternatively be interpreted as a premium for a health insurance
with full coverage. The proﬁtf u n c t i o no fh o s p i t a li is given by
Πi = pDi − kq
2
i, (1)
where Di is the demand for hospital i treatment.
A patient’s (ex-post) utility when going to hospital i is given by
ui (z;p): =u(qi,x i,z;p)=v + qi − p − t(z − xi)
2. (2)
9This assumption is made for convenience, but does not qualitatively aﬀect any
of the results in the paper.
10The assumption of production-independent quality costs is widely used in the
literature on quality competition in health care markets (see, e.g., Calem and Rizzo,
1995; Lyon, 1999; Gravelle and Masiero, 2000; Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2002).
11All results we derive also hold for constant marginal costs MC >0.L e te p denote
the mill price, then the mark-up is given by p = e p − MC.
6The maximum gross willingness to pay for hospital treatment, v,i s
assumed to be suﬃciently large for the entire market to be covered.
Thereby, we preclude monopoly and kink equilibria and concentrate on
competitive ones.12 Notice that this assumption essentially means that
all patients have access to hospital or specialist care, which seems reason-
able, at least for developed countries (without waiting lists). The last
term measures the mismatch costs incurred when treated by hospital
i =1 ,2. The parameter t>0 determines the importance of mismatch
costs relative to the quality of care. Of course, mismatch costs would be
zero if the patient suﬀers exactly from the disease for which the hospital
he goes to is specialised. Mismatch costs are assumed to be quadratically
increasing in distance.
To evaluate the eﬀects of gatekeeping we consider two diﬀerent pa-
tient types. The fraction λ ∈ [0,1] of the population is fully informed
when accessing the hospital market, i.e., these patients know their own
location (diagnosis) and the specialisation and quality provision of each
hospital. In the ﬁrst part of the paper (direct gatekeeping, Section 3) we
will assume that the number of fully informed patients is exogenously
given. In this case we can think of these patients as the chronically ill,
who know exactly what disease they are suﬀering from and have obtained
suﬃcient information about the hospital market through repeated con-
sumption. In the second part of the paper (indirect gatekeeping, Section
4) we will endogenise λ by explicitly modelling patients’ decision about
consulting a GP before accessing the hospital market. We will assume
that the GP has a gatekeeper role in the system and that he or she
obtains all signiﬁcant information. This information is then truthfully
conveyed to those patients consulting the GP, making them fully in-
formed about all relevant variables.
To simplify the analysis we assume that the fully informed patients
are uniformly distributed on S. Members of the remaining part of the
population, 1 − λ, only know v, the distribution of Z,a n dt h a tm e d i c a l
treatment is required. They cannot observe xi,q i,a n dz. For these
patients secondary care is an experience good. Their ex-ante utility of











where the superscript e denotes the expected value of the respective
variable. Patients learn their ex-post utility given by (2) only through
actual consumption.
12In a circular model, Economides (1993) and Nuscheler (2003) make similar as-
sumptions, whereas Salop (1979) and Gravelle (1999) study monopoly and kink equi-
libria in detail.
7For the direct gatekeeping scenario we will consider that the regulator
can only inﬂuence λ through direct regulation. In theory, it is possible
to imagine that the regulator can inﬂuence the amount of information
available to patients in the market through several diﬀerent means. We
will, however, focus on what is probably the most realistic regulatory
instrument, namely introducing a strict gatekeeping regime, where all
patients are required to consult a GP before accessing the hospital mar-
ket. Thus, the scope for regulating λ is restricted to setting λ =1 .I n
the indirect gatekeeping scenario, the regulator can indirectly inﬂuence
the endogenously determined value of λ through price regulation.
T h ei m p a c to fi n t r o d u c i n gg a t e k e e p i n gt ot h em a r k e tf o rh o s p i t a lo r
secondary care is analysed in a 5-stage game:
• Stage 1: the regulator sets her available regulatory variables. These
are one or both of p and λ. Regulation on the latter variable is
restricted to setting λ =1 .
• Stage 2: the hospitals simultaneously decide on their specialisa-
tions, x1 and x2,w h e r ex1,x 2 ∈ R,a n dx1 ≤ x2.
• Stage 3: the hospitals simultaneously set their quality levels q1 ≥ 0
and q2 ≥ 0.
• Stage 4: patient information about xi, qi,a n dz can be obtained
by consulting a gatekeeping general practitioner who truthfully
conveys information about the relevant variables. The choice of
consulting a GP is reserved for the second version of the model
(Section 4). In the ﬁrst version (Section 3) the share of fully in-
formed patients, λ, is exogenously given.
• Stage 5: the patients demand secondary care treatment.
The sequential structure of the game is argued by the diﬀerent degree
of irreversibility of strategic decisions. Clearly, the decision of whether
to consult a gatekeeping GP and/or which hospital to go to is the most
ﬂexible decision to be taken in the entire game. Changing quality or spe-
cialisation requires more eﬀort and investment. In both cases it may be
necessary to replace some medical machinery and/or have the current
staﬀ undergo signiﬁcant training, or even hire new staﬀ.A l t h o u g h i t
may sometimes be hard to distinguish between quality investments and
a change of specialisation, it seems logically consistent to assert that
hospitals ﬁrst decide what to produce (their service or speciality mix),
and then determine the quality of services.13 This sequential structure
13Calem and Rizzo (1995) discuss this in some more detail.
8is common in models that combine horizontal and vertical diﬀerentia-
tion (see, e.g., Economides, 1989; Calem and Rizzo, 1995; Bester, 1998;
Gravelle, 1999).
That the regulator can determine λ and p at the beginning of the
game essentially means that we consider commitment power on her side.
This assumption is, of course, crucial as in most sequential games. With
respect to λ, this may be justiﬁed since introducing a strict gatekeeping
system (λ =1 ) must be regarded as a major reform of the health care
system. This may be less clear with the price. As in Brekke et al.
(2002) and Nuscheler (2003) there will be an incentive to reoptimise
after specialisations have been chosen. Nevertheless, since commitment
is valuable for the regulator, one could argue that she should be able to
obtain such commitment power, either through reputation or by creating
institutional mechanisms that makes it costly, or otherwise diﬃcult, to
change the regulated price. In any case, as price regulation is not the
major focus of the present paper we will concentrate on the commitment
case.
3 Direct gatekeeping
In this section we will consider that λ ∈ [0,1] is exogenous and can only
be regulated directly by setting λ =1 . Hence, the regulator determines
whether or not to introduce a strict gatekeeping system, and thereby
make all patients fully informed. The game is solved by backward in-
duction.
3.1 The specialisation-quality game
3.1.1 The demand for secondary care
The share 1−λ o ft h ep o p u l a t i o ni su n i n f o r m e da b o u tt h ea c t u a lq u a l i t y
levels and about specialisations. Moreover, these people do not know
the disease they suﬀer from. To make a decision about which hospital
to consult, patients have to evaluate their expected utility, given by
equation (3), for both hospitals. Imposing symmetry, these patients are
indiﬀerent between hospitals in expected terms. Both hospitals receive
one half of these patients, (1 − λ)/2.
This assumption is not necessary, but it eases the presentation of the
main ideas dramatically. Actual demand depends on the patients’ be-
liefs which inﬂuence expected utilities. Since these beliefs do not change
the optimisation problem of the hospitals (see below), they can be ne-
glected at the earlier stages of the game. Nevertheless, beliefs have to
be conﬁrmed in equilibrium and, as we concentrate on symmetric equi-
libria, beliefs will also be symmetric. Our assumption that each hospital
9g e t sh a l fo ft h eu n i n f o r m e dp a t i e n t si st h u st h eo u t c o m eo fam o r eg e n -
eral treatment.14 Given the symmetry assumption, the decision about
which hospital to attend reduces to ﬂipping a fair coin - which seems
not unrealistic.
In contrast, the informed fraction of the population, λ,i sr e s p o n -
sive to quality investments and specialisation decisions as both strategic
variables and the own disease are observable. The informed patient who
is indiﬀerent between hospital 1 and hospital 2 suﬀers from disease z,
which is obtained by solving u1 (z;p)=u2 (z;p) for z,w h e r eui is given








The demand for hospital 1 is thus D1 = λz +( 1− λ)/2.H o s p i t a l 2
receives the residual demand D2 =1− D1 = λ(1 − z)+( 1− λ)/2.
3.1.2 Quality competition
We look for an equilibrium in pure strategies in the quality subgame.15 If
a pure strategy equilibrium exists, it is found by inserting demand from
equation (4) into the proﬁt function (1) and optimising with respect to







where ∆ := x2 − x1. The equilibrium quality levels depend only on
the distance between hospitals’ locations and not on their actual loca-
tions. An immediate implication is that optimal specialisations will be
characterised by some certain distance and not by absolute locations.
From (5) we see that lim∆→0 q∗ (∆;λ,p) →∞ . Since quality invest-
ments are costly, this means that (5) yields negative proﬁts if ∆ is suﬃ-




where investment incentives are so strong that hospitals are led into ‘ru-
inous competition’. Thus, in order to secure positive proﬁts - and thus
pure strategy equilibrium existence - we have to impose a restriction
that the hospitals are not located too closely. Let Q be the set of all
14Although there is a game of incomplete information (the fraction 1−λ of patients
do not know their disease type) and imperfect information (the fraction 1 − λ of
patients cannot observe qualities and specialisations), beliefs are irrelevant for the
outcome. Subgame perfection is thus suﬃcient to obtain a unique symmetric (perfect
Bayesian) equilibrium. This changes when λ is endogenised.
15The concept of mixed strategies does not seem to make much sense in the context
of hospital quality investments, so we disregard this possibility by assumption.
10location pairs (x1,x 2) such that a Nash equilibrium exists in the quality




8t2∆2 (1 − λ + λ(x1 + x2))
. (6)
Assuming that (6) is satisﬁed, the comparative static results are
straightforward: the smaller product diﬀerentiation, i.e., the smaller ∆,
the more intense is quality competition. Patients are more responsive to
quality improvements when mismatch costs are small. Thus t is a mea-
sure of competition intensity. Not very surprisingly, an increase in the
quality cost parameter k has an adverse eﬀect on quality provision. The
better medical treatments are paid, the higher the beneﬁts of capturing
additional market shares from the competitor. At this stage of the game
the only means of competition is the quality of care and thus hospitals
will improve their quality. The comparative statics with respect to λ are
t h es a m ea sw i t hr e s p e c tt op: more informed patients lead to higher
quality provision.
Because of its exogeneity, the fraction 1−λ of the population cannot
have any eﬀect on competition, thus, λ can be interpreted as the density
of patients that are distributed along the Hotelling line. When deﬁning
b p := λp w eo b t a i nt h es a m er e s u l t sa sB r e k k ee ta l .( 2 0 0 2 ) .
3.1.3 Specialisation
At this stage of the game hospitals decide on their specialisation, tak-
ing the eﬀects on quality competition and demand into account. In
order to obtain a perfect pure strategy equilibrium of the specialisation-
quality game, we follow the approach taken in similar location mod-
els16 and restrict the strategy space of the specialisation game to the
set Q, for which a pure strategy equilibrium of the quality game ob-
tains. Intuitively, it seems highly plausible to assume that the hospitals
will not consider locations which trigger incentives for ‘ruinous compe-
tition’. Following Economides (1986), we deﬁn et h ed i r e c t i o ni nw h i c h
∂Πi/∂xi is positive as the ‘relocation tendency’ of ﬁrm i. An equilib-
rium of the specialisation game must then be at the zero relocation locus,
∂Π1/∂x1 = ∂Π2/∂x2 =0 , and a perfect equilibrium of the specialisation-
quality game is deﬁned as the intersection between the zero relocation


















2) ∈ Q; i =1 ,2.
16See, e.g., Economides (1984, 1986, 1989), Hinloopen and Marrewijk (1999), Lam-
bertini (2001).
11Inserting the optimal quality levels into hospital 1’s proﬁt function,










As already mentioned, setting ∂Π1/∂x1 =0only yields ∆∗. There exists
a continuum of locations fulﬁlling x2 − x1 = ∆∗. Imposing symmetry


























It is easily shown that the second-order conditions are met. How-
ever, it remains to identify the exact condition for equilibrium existence.
According to the speciﬁcation of the game, two requirements must be
met. First, we need to have that (x∗
1,x ∗
2) ∈ Q.S e c o n d ,i tm u s tn o tb ea
proﬁtable strategy for either ﬁrm to deviate in the quality subgame by
oﬀering zero quality and only serve the uninformed consumers arriving
in equilibrium. Using (9) and (5), and imposing symmetry in the proﬁt
function, it is straightforward to show that both requirements are met,





For the remainder of the analysis, we will assume that this condition is
met.
The hospitals’ location incentives are governed by two opposing forces.
Ceteris paribus, each hospital can obtain a larger share of the market
by moving closer to its rival. On the other hand, closer locations imply
that quality competition is intensiﬁe d ,a sc a nb es e e nf r o me q u a t i o n( 5 ) .
Consider an increase in the price p. This will strengthen the market
share eﬀect, since hospitals now receive a higher mark-up on each treat-
ment. However, a price increase also means that quality competition is
ampliﬁed. From (9) we see that the latter eﬀect always dominates: a
higher price implies that hospitals aim at dampening the resulting in-
crease in quality competition by locating further apart. Indeed, as long
as the fee for secondary care treatments exceeds marginal costs (and λ is
strictly positive), quality competition among providers induces product
diﬀerentiation.
12An identical mechanism determines the relationship between patient
information and locations. More informed patients will result in stronger
quality competition and hospitals will respond by diﬀerentiating more.17
A social planner thus faces a trade-oﬀ when setting the price or taking
measures to improve information in the market. The improved quality
has to be weighed against the change in aggregate mismatch costs.
We have already identiﬁed the mismatch cost parameter t as a mea-
sure of competition intensity. A low t boosts quality provision and - to
dampen this eﬀect - hospitals locate further apart. Finally, an increase
in the quality cost parameter k reduces quality competition, resulting in
less product diﬀerentiation. When inserting (9) into (5) we obtain the











Consider a social planner who aims at maximising social welfare. As-
suming symmetry in qualities and locations the social welfare function
is given by







∆(λ − ∆). (12)
Note that we consider that acquiring information about the market is
costless, i.e., gatekeeping involves no costs.18 We will relax this assump-
tion when endogenising λ in Section 4.
3.2.1 The second-best optimum
Let us ﬁrst consider the case where λ cannot be regulated by the social
planner at all. In this sense the solution derived here may be called a







Maximising the last term of equation (12) yields ∆sb = λ/2,w h i c h


















17This result is clearly dependent on the mode of competition. If we allow the
ﬁrms (hospitals) to compete on prices, and not qualities, the opposite result would
apply (cf. Schultz, 2002).
18If we interpret p as a per patient (or per treatment) reimbursement from a gov-
ernment agency, this particular speciﬁcation of social welfare also relies on the as-
sumption that the third party (i.e., the regulator) is able to raise the necessary funds
in a non-distortionary manner.
13The regulator faces the following fundamental trade-oﬀ:o nt h eo n eh a n d ,
the mismatch costs incurred by the informed patients are minimised
when hospitals locate at 1
4 and 3
4, respectively. These locations would
obtain when the entire population is informed, λ =1 . On the other hand,
as the uninformed patients choose a provider randomly, their mismatch
costs are at a minimum when hospitals do not specialise and agglomerate
at the market centre, i.e., at 1
2. Minimum diﬀerentiation would obtain















3.2.2 The ﬁrst-best optimum
Now consider that the regulator has the available option of introducing
a strict gatekeeping regime, which amounts to setting λ =1 .F r o m
equation (12) it is easily seen that ∂W/∂λ ≥ 0 for all feasible values.
The social planner would thus implement a strict gatekeeping regime


















The aim of this subsection is to show that introducing strict gatekeeping,
i.e., setting λ =1 , is not necessarily socially beneﬁcial when the price
is exogenously given. This may be surprising at ﬁrst sight since strict
gatekeeping implies that additional information is acquired. Taking the
competitive eﬀects into account it may turn out that - although gate-
keeping is costless - strict gatekeeping is harmful from a social welfare
perspective. The relationship between social welfare and the share of
informed patients is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For an exogenously given price, social welfare is max-
imised at
(i) λ =1if mismatch costs are suﬃciently high,
(ii) λ ∈ (0,1) if mismatch costs are suﬃciently low and quality costs
are suﬃciently high.
Proof. Inserting (9) and (11) into (12) yields a welfare function






















































( i )W eh a v et h a t∂W
∂λ > 0 for all permissible values of λ if t>2p.
(ii) Assume that t<2p. I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v et h a t∂W
∂λ > (<)0 if
k<(>)k :=
27pt
32λ2(2p−t)3.S i n c e limλ→0 k →∞and ∂2W
∂λ2 < 0 it follows
that social welfare is maximised for a unique value of λ that lies strictly
b e t w e e n0a n d1i fk>
27pt
32(2p−t)3.
Ceteris paribus, more informed patients lead to more intense compe-
tition between the hospitals, which implies a higher provision of qual-
ity and more diﬀerentiation. If mismatch costs are high, the degree of
competition between hospitals is low, which further implies that the in-
centives for horizontal diﬀerentiation are also low. In this case from a
welfare point of view there is underprovision of quality and an insuﬃcient
degree of diﬀerentiation. A larger share of informed patients would thus
increase eﬃciency with respect to both quality provision and horizontal
diﬀerentiation.
However, more informed patients could lead to excessive competition
if mismatch costs are suﬃciently low. If, in addition, quality costs are
suﬃciently high, so that ﬁrst-best quality provision is relatively low, a
fully informed market would lead to both excessive diﬀerentiation and
overprovision of quality. This could be suﬃcient to outweigh the beneﬁts
of increased patient information on aggregate mismatch costs, implying
that social welfare is maximised in a situation where not all patients are
fully informed.
The welfare implications of introducing a strict gatekeeping regime
follows immediately:
Corollary 1 For an exogenously given price, introducing a strict gate-
keeping regime is detrimental to social welfare if (i) mismatch costs are
suﬃciently low, (ii) quality investments are suﬃciently costly, or (iii)
the fraction of a priori informed patients is suﬃciently high.
In other words, costless gatekeeping can reduce social welfare due to
excessive competition between health care providers. In order better to
illustrate the main mechanisms behind this result we provide a numerical
example.
153.3.1 A numerical example
Let p =1and k =1 . Then the remaining parameters of the model
are t and λ.20 We illustrate the case of fairly intense competition with
t =1 /2 (Case 1) and moderate competition with t =3 /2 (Case 2). In
Table 1 we present the outcome of the location-quality game, with the
associated level of social welfare, for diﬀerent values of λ.
Table 1: Equilibrium outcomes for p =1 , k =1
Case 1, t =1 /2 Case 2, t =3 /2
λ q∗ ∆∗ W∗ − v q∗ ∆∗ W∗ − v
0.1 0.11 0.46 0.022 0.07 0.22 −0.072
0.2 0.17 0.58 0.043 0.12 0.28 −0.043
0.3 0.22 0.67 0.051 0.16 0.32 −0.021
0.4 0.27 0.74 0.051 0.19 0.35 −0.002
0.5 0.31 0.79 0.046 0.22 0.38 0.015
0.6 0.36 0.84 0.035 0.25 0.41 0.030
0.7 0.39 0.89 0.021 0.27 0.43 0.043
0.8 0.43 0.93 0.003 0.30 0.45 0.054
0.9 0.47 0.97 −0.018 0.32 0.46 0.065
1 0.5 1 −0.042 0.35 0.48 0.075
As can be seen from equation (5), quality competition is intense for
low values of the mismatch cost parameter t. Thus, hospitals provide
higher quality in Case 1 than in Case 2. To mitigate costly quality com-
petition, hospitals aim at making their products less substitutable. This
incentive is clearly higher in Case 1, partially oﬀsetting the competition
eﬀect. In Case 1, increasing the share of informed patients is beneﬁcial
for low values of λ. Besides the net beneﬁts derived from higher qual-
ity provision, patients may also gain from reduced mismatch costs. As
λ increases, though, the centrifugal force drives hospitals further away
from the market centre, combined with an increase in quality provi-
sion. At λ =0 .4 we see that there are both overprovision of quality and
too much diﬀerentiation, compared with the ﬁrst-best solution, implying
that a further increase in λ unambiguously reduces welfare.21 In fact,
since limλ→0 (W∗ − v)=0we see that implementing a strict gatekeep-
ing system would be socially detrimental even if there are no informed
patients to begin with. This changes when Case 2 is considered, where
20Of course v is another not yet speciﬁed parameter. The actual size is irrelevant
for the model (as long as v is suﬃciently large), so we will keep this general.
21As hospitals still specialise within the disease space, our example shows that
Proposition 1 does not rely on the assumption that hospitals are allowed to locate
outside the disease space.
16moderate specialisation incentives are at work. In this case it pays to
generally demand a GP referral.
3.4 Price regulation
The results of the previous section hinge on the assumption that the price
is exogenous. We will now consider the case where the regulator is able
also to use the price as a regulatory instrument. Assuming second-best
price regulation, the following result obtains:
Proposition 2 With second-best price regulation, introducing a strict
gatekeeping system always improves social welfare.
Proof. Again, inserting (9) and (11) into (12) yields the welfare
function W (p,λ).B y d e ﬁning b p := pλ we can deﬁne a new welfare
function c W (b p,λ). Maximising W (p,λ) with respect to p and λ is then
equivalent to maximising c W (b p,λ) with respect to b p and λ.T a k i n gt h e









> 0.T h u s ,
social welfare is maximised by setting λ =1 .
From (9) and (11) we know that p and λ have identical eﬀects on
equilibrium diﬀerentiation and quality provision. Thus, by using the
price instrument properly, the regulator can induce exactly the same
location-quality outcome for any given value of λ. Consider an increase
in the share of informed patients in the market. The resulting eﬀects -
stronger quality competition and larger diﬀerentiation - can be exactly
oﬀset by reducing the price accordingly. This would, however, have an
unambiguously positive eﬀect on social welfare - even though diﬀerentia-
tion and quality provision remain unchanged - since expected aggregate
mismatch costs are reduced when fewer patients run the risk of attending
the ‘wrong’ hospital. Thus, the regulator can maximise social welfare
by introducing a strict gatekeeping system in order to make all patients
fully informed, and then use price regulation to correct for the potential
negative eﬀects of increased information.22
4 Indirect gatekeeping
In this section we endogenise the share of informed patients, λ.W e
assume that patients have the choice of consulting a gatekeeping GP,
thereby obtaining all relevant information, before accessing the hospital
market. To obtain an interior solution for λ we consider cost hetero-
geneity with respect to GP consultation. Let y ∈ [0,1] denote the cost
22A more detailed discussion of the optimal second-best price in the case of a strict
gatekeeping system is presented in Brekke et al. (2002).
17type of a patient. The associated costs are assumed to be ay,w h e r e
a>0. This heterogeneity can simply be justiﬁed by an opportunity
cost argument, e.g., by varying time costs due to diﬀe r e n tw a g ee a r n -
ing abilities. To simplify the analysis we assume that patient types are
uniformly distributed on the disease space S.
The GP consultation decision is based on the expected beneﬁts of
gatekeeping relative to a patient’s cost type. Beneﬁts are in expected
terms as prior to consultation none of the patients can observe specialisa-
tion, quality and disease. So, in a game-theoretic sense, the consultation
decision is simultaneous to specialisation and quality decisions. Since
hospitals cannot observe patients’ consultation decisions, and since they
do not know a patient’s cost type, they have to form beliefs about the
actual consultation rate. We are solving for the perfect Bayesian equi-
librium where expectations will be conﬁrmed. Additionally, we require
that beliefs have to be consistent out of equilibrium. This restriction is
discussed in some detail below.
4.1 The specialisation-quality game
4.1.1 The demand for secondary care and GP consultation
The demand for hospital 1 is exactly the same as in the previous section
for a given share λ of informed patients. So for this subsection it remains
to determine the consultation decision.
When deciding whether to approach a (randomly chosen) hospital
directly or to consult a gatekeeping GP ﬁrst, a patient has to weigh the
costs of going to a GP against the beneﬁts. Imposing the same symme-
try assumption as previously, the quality of hospital care is unimportant
for this problem. The quality received is independent of whether a GP
was consulted or not. Determining the beneﬁts of gatekeeping simply
requires ascertaining the expected reduction in mismatch costs. This
requires to forming expectations ∆e about the degree of product dif-
ferentiation ∆ in the market. We will assume that these expectations
are symmetric, which seems plausible as patients are (except for consul-
tation costs) ex-ante identical. As before we will assume that patients
know that the equilibrium will be symmetric, i.e., that hospitals locate
equidistantly from the market centre, but on opposite sides.

























































The expected beneﬁt of gatekeeping, Be := MMCe
DA−MMCe






The equilibrium value of λ is obtained by equating the expected beneﬁts





The comparative static results are intuitive: the higher the costs of
consulting a GP, a, the lower the share of patients actually going to a GP.
The beneﬁts of gatekeeping are increasing in mismatch costs, since some
costs may be avoided by obtaining information. Aggregate expected
mismatch costs are determined by two diﬀerent factors. For any given
positive distance between the hospitals, these costs are obviously increas-
ing in the mismatch cost parameter t. In addition, expected aggregate
mismatch costs are increasing in the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation.
The further apart the hospitals are located, the more costly, in terms of
mismatch costs, to attend the ‘wrong’ hospital.
4.1.2 Quality competition and specialisation
We now assume that for any patient consultation strategy hospitals’
expectations about the fraction of informed consumers is equal to the
actual fraction induced by that strategy. In other words, we require
beliefs to be consistent out of equilibrium. With this a hospital’s best
response against patients strategies can be written in terms of the frac-
tion of informed patients. Notice that the restriction on strategies that
the lowest cost types demand GP referral, as used in equation (21), is
irrelevant from a hospital perspective. Only the expected share of in-
formed patients matters and not their actual composition.
The equilibrium of the quality subgame is thus simply obtained by
substituting λ by λ








The comparative static properties are comparable to those with direct
gatekeeping. The same applies to product diﬀerentiation, which is ob-











194.1.3 The solution of the game
Imposing rational expectations, we obtain the solution of the game. One
r e q u i r e m e n ti st h a th o s p i t a l s ’e x p e c t a t i o n sa r ec o n ﬁrmed, λ
e = λ,a n d
the other that patients’ expectations are conﬁrmed, ∆e = ∆.B y i n -














where the subscript ‘u’ indicates that the equilibrium is unstable, and
‘s’ that it is stable. This will be shown in the proposition below.
The corresponding quality levels are obtained by substituting equa-










Using the equilibrium product diﬀerentiation displayed in equation (24),
we can solve for the share of GP patients by substituting the respective














Proposition 3 With endogenous GP consultation there are two sym-
















are given by equations (24), (25), and (26). The equilibrium given in (i)
is unstable and the equilibrium shown in (ii) is stable.
Proof. (i) That S∗∗
u i sa ne q u i l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m ei ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .
Consider that all patients expect that the hospitals will not diﬀerentiate,
∆e =0 . Given these expectations, the beneﬁts of gatekeeping are zero,
Be =0 . Since there are positive costs of consulting a GP, nobody will ac-
tually go to a gatekeeper, i.e. λ =0 . Hospitals correctly anticipate these
expectations: they know that patients are completely uninformed and
thus not responsive to quality investments. Consequently, hospitals set
q∗∗
u =0 . Hospitals do not incur any costs in this scenario so they cannot
do better than conﬁrm expectations on specialisation and agglomerate
at the same point. However, this equilibrium is unstable when expecta-
tions have to be consistent out of equilibrium. Then, wrong expectations
on λ on the hospitals’ side directly translate into wrong expectations on









20Now consider that ∆e ∈ (0,∆∗∗
s ).S i n c e ∆∗∗ (∆∗∗
s )=∆∗∗
s and ∆∗∗ is
increasing and concave in ∆e, this implies ∆∗∗ (∆e) > ∆e.A s e x p e c -
tations are not conﬁrmed, ∆e cannot be an equilibrium of the game.
Moreover, since actual diﬀerentiation exceeds expectations, there is no
force driving expectations back to zero, proving instability.
(ii) Here it remains to show that the equilibrium is stable. First,
assume that ∆e ∈ (0,∆∗∗
s ), then - as above - we have that ∆∗∗ (∆e) > ∆e,
driving expectations back to ∆∗∗
s . Second, consider that ∆e > ∆∗∗
s ;t h e n
we have ∆∗∗ (∆e) < ∆e. This not only proves that ∆e > ∆∗∗
s can never
be an equilibrium, but also that expectations will be driven back towards
∆∗∗
s .
Requiring consistent beliefs out of equilibrium enables us to prove
instability of S∗∗
u and stability of S∗∗
s . Although it seems plausible to
concentrate on S∗∗
s note that S∗∗
u can easily be supported as a stable
equilibrium when consistency is not imposed. Consider that hospitals
expect that nobody will become informed, λ
e =0 ,i n d e p e n d e n to fw h a t
patients’ strategies would actually suggest. Then hospitals do not diﬀer-
entiate and there are zero beneﬁts of gatekeeping. As patients correctly
anticipate missing specialisation incentives, λ
e =0will always be con-
ﬁrmed.
As we concentrate on the stable equilibrium, we ease notation by sup-
pressing the index ‘s’ in the remainder of the paper. In order to analyse
the comparative static properties of the equilibrium it is convenient to
neglect the restriction λ
∗∗ ∈ [0,1]. We will be more precise about that
later.
The share of the population going to a gatekeeping GP increases
in the mismatch cost parameter, t,a st h i sd r i v e su pt h eb e n e ﬁts of
gatekeeping. It also increases in price. This is an indirect eﬀect stemming
from specialisation. Price increases boost quality competition and, to
dampen this eﬀect, hospitals aim at reducing the substitutability of their
products, increasing the beneﬁts of gatekeeping. Obviously, λ
∗∗ is a
decreasing function of a. The higher the disutility incurred by consulting
a GP the lower the share of patients who actually consult one. Finally,
an increase in the quality cost parameter, k, reduces quality competition
and thereby diﬀerentiation incentives. This, in turn, reduces the beneﬁts
of gatekeeping.
Compared to the previous section, there are two major diﬀerences in
the comparative static properties of quality. Firstly, the mismatch costs
parameter has no eﬀect. With direct gatekeeping, patients were more
responsive to quality investments at lower values of t, amplifying quality
competition. As can be seen from equation (22), this is also true here,
but this eﬀect is opposed by the consultation eﬀect. A lower t reduces
21the beneﬁts of gatekeeping, resulting in a less competitive market. With
linear costs of GP consulting these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset. Secondly,
an increase in consulting costs, a,l o w e r sλ
∗∗ and thereby softens quality
competition. The latter eﬀect is also present with respect to the special-
isation decisions: high consulting costs weaken the competition eﬀect,
making product diﬀerentiation less desirable.
4.2 Social welfare
Subtracting the consulting cost term a
R λ
0 xdx, the social welfare function
c a nb er e w r i t t e nf r o me q u a t i o n( 1 2 ) ,



























First-best quality is identical to the previous analysis, and depends only
on the costs of quality investments. Specialisation is the second-best
from Section 3.2.1, and is thus conditional on the share of GP patients.
Most importantly, although not surprising, the ﬁrst-best λ coincides with
individual decisions, so there is no need to regulate gatekeeping directly.
Proposition 4 The ﬁrst-best eﬃcient solution of the game with endoge-
nous gatekeeping has quality qfb = 1
4k and
(i) ∆fb =0and λ
fb =0for t<8a,
(ii) λ
fb ∈ [0,1] and ∆fb = λ
fb/2 for t =8 a,a n d
(iii) ∆fb = 1
2 and λ
fb =1for t>8a.
Proof. The ﬁrst-best solution in (i) is an interior solution where
both ﬁrst-order conditions, ∆fb = λ
2 and λ
fb = t∆
4a,a r es a t i s ﬁed. As
λ is restricted to the unit interval there are situations where λ
fb =
t∆
4a does not hold, i.e. when parameters are such that λ exceeds one.
Considering the unrestricted Hotelling model the ﬁrst order condition
for ∆ can always be met. Inserting ∆ = λ







.F o rt>8a the regulator sets λ to its maximum,
λ
fb =1 ,a n d∆fb =1 /2. Obviously, the regulator is indiﬀerent between
all feasible values of λ when t =8 a.
The mismatch cost parameter has two opposing eﬀects on the ben-
eﬁts of gatekeeping. On the one hand, a higher value of t increases
expected aggregate mismatch costs for every given pair of hospital loca-
tions. On the other hand, an increase in t reduces quality competition
22and leads to less diﬀerentiation, which reduces the beneﬁts of gatekeep-
ing. Using (20) and (24) it is straightforward to show that the former
(direct) eﬀect always dominates, i.e., ∂Be/∂t > 0, implying that the
beneﬁts of gatekeeping are increasing in the mismatch cost parameter
t. Consequently, when t is suﬃciently low relative to GP consulting
costs, t<8a, the beneﬁts of increased information, in terms of reduced
expected mismatch costs, are outweighed by the costs of going to a GP.
4.3 Price regulation
When setting the optimal price, the regulator trades oﬀ ineﬃciencies
along three diﬀerent dimensions: quality provision, horizontal diﬀeren-
tiation and GP consultation. In general, this will not result in a strict
gatekeeping regime. The objective function is obtained by inserting the
equilibrium values of the specialisation-quality-consultation game into







The following equilibrium obtains:
∆
sb =

































It is straightforward to show that the second-best price given by (30) is




Thus, if k<k we have a corner solution with λ
sb =1 .23 Given that
∂k/∂t > 0 and ∂k/∂a < 0, the implications for indirect gatekeeping
follow immediately:
Proposition 5 Second-best price regulation implies a de facto strict
gatekeeping regime if quality costs or GP consulting costs are suﬃciently
small, or if mismatch costs are suﬃciently high.
23From (32) it follows that an interior solution always meets the existence condition
if a<t / 2.
23The intuition is basically the same as before: gatekeeping is a way
of reducing expected aggregate mismatch costs, and the social beneﬁts
of gatekeeping are consequently linked to these costs that are increasing
in t and decreasing in k. Of course, the role of GP consulting costs
is straightforward: the smaller a, the larger share of the population
consults a GP to obtain information.
In the following we will only consider interior solutions.24 Thus, GP
consultation will generally be ineﬃcient. The eﬃciency properties of the
second-best interior solution are summarised as follows:
Proposition 6 The second-best (interior) solution of the specialisation-
quality-consultation game has the following properties:
(i) for t<8a there is too much diﬀerentiation given λ
sb and ineﬃ-
ciently low quality provision,
















(iii) for t>8a there is insuﬃcient diﬀerentiation given λ
sb and
ineﬃciently high quality provision.
Proof. First-best specialisation, conditional on the share of GP-
patients, requires ∆sb = λ








> (<)0if t<(>)8a. First-best quality is given by qfb =
1
4k.F r o m( 3 1 )w eh a v et h a tqsb −qfb = −
(8a−t)
128ka < (>)0if t<(>)8a.
We have an interior solution if GP consultation costs are suﬃciently
high. From (25) we know that a high value of a implies that quality
provision will be relatively low in equilibrium. We also know that a
price above marginal costs is in any case a necessary condition to prevent
under-provision of quality. If, in addition, mismatch costs are relatively
low, the value of obtaining information will be limited and, consequently,
GP consulting will be low in equilibrium. Since the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient
level of quality provision is independent of mismatch costs, this implies
that social welfare is maximised at a low degree of diﬀerentiation. In this
case, t<8a, the price that yields ﬁrst-best diﬀerentiation is not high
enough to generate eﬃcient quality provision. Thus, higher quality can
only be obtained at the expense of excessive diﬀerentiation, and these
considerations are optimally traded oﬀ at a price which yields under-
provision of quality and too much diﬀerentiation.
On the other hand, if mismatch costs are high, the ﬁrst-best level of
diﬀerentiation will be higher - closer to 1
2 - due to higher GP consultation.
24For a discussion of optimal price regulation in the corner solution (strict gate-
keeping), see Brekke et al. (2002).
24In this case, t>8a,t h eo p t i m a ld e g r e eo fd i ﬀerentiation is obtained
at a price that yields over-provision of quality. Consequently, optimal
regulation implies accepting a less than optimal degree of diﬀerentiation
in order to avoid too much over-investment in quality.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Equipping GPs with a gatekeeper role in the health care system is a
major issue in the debate on health care reforms. Among politicians,
the conventional wisdom is that gatekeeping contributes to cost control.
This is somewhat surprising since evidence is lacking, as was demon-
strated in an empirical study by Barros (1998). Economists are more
concerned about eﬃciency arguments rather than ﬁscal ones. As GPs
are usually better informed than patients about the characteristics of the
secondary health care market, e.g. about quality and specialisation of
hospitals, matching of patients to hospitals may indeed be improved by
gatekeeping. However, this argument neglects the potential competitive
eﬀects in the hospital market. We presented a model that analyses the
competitive eﬀects of gatekeeping in the presence of non-price competi-
tion.
While prices were regulated, we allowed for competition in speciali-
sation and quality. We considered two versions of the basic model, one
i nw h i c ht h es h a r eo fe xa n t ei n f o r m e dp a t i e n t si se x o g e n o u s l yg i v e n( d i -
rect gatekeeping), and another where the share of informed patients is
endogenously determined (indirect gatekeeping).
In the direct gatekeeping scenario we assumed gatekeeping to be cost-
less. We found that when the price is exogenously given strict gatekeep-
ing does not necessarily improve social welfare. This is the case when the
a d d i t i o n a li n f o r m a t i o na c q u i r e db yG P sb o o s t sc o m p e t i t i o nt os u c ha n
extend that excessive specialisation of hospitals occurs. In these cases,
due to the endogeneity of specialisations, mismatch costs are higher with
gatekeeping than without. This raises doubts about whether gatekeep-
ing improves eﬃciency. Things change dramatically when allowing for
second-best price regulation. We demonstrated that strict gatekeeping,
i.e. GP consultation is compulsory before accessing the secondary care
market, is always socially desirable. Thus, direct gatekeeping should
always be accompanied by proper price regulation.
Gatekeeping was endogenised by introducing cost heterogeneity with
respect to GP consultation. Since consultation decisions of patients are
the same to what a social planner would implement, there is no need for
direct regulation of gatekeeping. GP consultation can be indirectly in-
ﬂuenced by price regulation. With second-best price regulation, a strict
gatekeeping regime obtains if the beneﬁts of gatekeeping are suﬃciently
25high (improved matching outweighs the potentially negative competitive
eﬀects) compared to its costs. When the share of GP patients is below
one, the second-best outcome will, in general, be ineﬃcient. Depend-
ing on the parameters, there may be too much diﬀerentiation and too
low quality or vice versa. Direct implementation of a strict gatekeeping
regime may again reduce social welfare.
The analysis demonstrates that eﬃciency gains that are usually at-
tributed to GP gatekeeping cannot be taken for granted when non-price
competition is incorporated into the analysis. In the short run, eﬃciency
gains may indeed be obtained by better matches. However, quality pro-
vision may still be ineﬃcient. In the long run, hospitals will adjust their
specialisation so that diﬀerentiation increases and this counteracts the
positive short run eﬀect.
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